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THE SHACKLES OF COVENANT MARRIAGE: WHO HOLDS THE
KEYS TO WEDLOCK?
Chauncey E. Brummer*
[T]o have and to hold, from this day forward, for better, for worse, for
richer, for poorer, in sickness or in health, to love, and to cherish, as long
as life shall last .... I
These words, which have always signaled enduring commitment, have
somehow lost their glow in a society steeped in suspicion and faltering in
faith. No longer are wedding vows sufficient evidence of an intent to form a
permanent bond. Now in force and continually on the horizon are state laws
that create super marriages with super vows that threaten traditional assump-
tions about the institution.2 Couples may now explore a marriage alternative
that protects them against themselves and legally binds them to their wed-
ding vows.
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries marriage has been considered a relationship that tran-
scends its legal definition as a civil status by adopting fundamental precepts
of natural law and religious heritage.3 The concept of marriage as a union
between one man and one woman for life has been basic to so many civiliza-
tions that it has withstood numerous attempts to dramatically alter its de-
sign.4 In fact, governments have gone to great lengths to preserve good,
healthy marriages by providing laws that establish marital rights and ac-
knowledge the right of a party to seek dissolution only when the relationship
no longer serves the state's or the parties' interests.5 The bottom line has
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. The author wishes to thank the
University of Arkansas School of Law for summer research assistance used to support writ-
ing this article.
1. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-404 (LEXIS Supp. 2002) (providing specifically for the
use of these words as part of the ritual for marriage conducted by a judge or justice).
2. See Editorial, "Super Marriage" Hasn't Caught On, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct.
29, 1997, at B 10 [hereinafter "Super Marriage"].
3. See, e.g., John J. Coughlin, Natural Law, Marriage, and the Thought of Karol Wo-
jtyla, 28 FORDHAM Uin3. L.J. 1771, 1774 (2001).
4. See Anita K. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and the Politics
ofMarriage Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1231, 1235-36 (1998).
5. Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145, 163-65
(1998).
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always been to maintain marriages that work and to permit disposal of those
which serve no beneficial purpose.
In a recent crusade to protect the integrity of marriage, Louisiana, Ari-
zona, and Arkansas have passed laws that are designed to accentuate the
lifelong character of marriage by permitting parties to enter into what are
called "covenant marriages. ' 6 Since passage of the first covenant marriage
law in Louisiana in 1997, covenant marriage legislation has been introduced
in at least twenty-three states.7 Currently, covenant marriage bills are under
consideration in Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.8 The
formation of national interest groups like the Covenant Marriage Movement
provides the clearest indication that legislators in other states will face per-
sistent pressure from civic and religious organizations to enact such laws. 9
Covenant marriage laws extend, to both couples anticipating marriage
and to those already married, the option of designating their marriage as a
"covenant marriage," thereby limiting the grounds upon which divorce can
be achieved.' The direct consequence of such a relationship can be viewed
as either liberating or debilitating, based upon the ability of the couple to
6. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to -906 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 (LEXIS Repl. 2002); LA. CODE ANN. Civ. art. 102 (West 1999).
7. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. See Divorce
Reform Page, at http://patriot.net/-crouch/divorce.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2003).
8. See S.B. 1259, 114th Gen. Assem. (S.C. 2002); H.B. 1878, 91st Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002); H.B. 901, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2002); H.B. 2641, 48th Leg.
Sess. (Okla. 2002); S.B. 384, 112th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2002).
9. The Covenant Marriage Movement consists of church and para-church organizations
that promote covenant marriage through religious leaders, politicians, educators, counselors,
statisticians, social scientists, and others to affirm the importance of establishing and main-
taining wholesome marriage relationships. Among the organizations affiliated are: Covenant
Marriages Ministry, Covenant Rebuilders, CrossLife Ministries, Ethics and Religious Liberty
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, Family Evangelism Unit of the North
American Mission Board, FamilyLife, Family Foundations International, FOCCUS, Inc.,
Focus on the Family, Friends of the Family, Growth in Marriage Ministries, Heart Menders
International, Inc., Intimate Life Ministries, Journey to Intimacy, LifeMates Ministries,
LifeWay Christian Resources, Living Way Ministries, Marriage Ministries International,
Marriage Savers, Masterful Living, Moody Bible Institute, National Association of Marriage
Enhancement, Promise Keepers, Smally Relationship Center, Southern Baptist Association of
Counselors and Family Ministers, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary Department of
Pastoral Care and Counseling, Turnbull Ministries, Wellington Boone Ministries, and Your
Ministry Counseling Services. Covenant Marriage Movement, About Us, at http://www.
covenantmarriage.com/templates/cuscovmarriage/details.asp?id=20786&PI D=34215 (last
visited Jan. 10, 2003).
10. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Beyond Baehr: Strengthening the Definition of Marriage, 12
BYU J. PuB. L. 277, 292 (1998).
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weather the storms of matrimony." Because states typically provide a broad
range of grounds for divorce, which may range from adultery to irreconcil-
able differences, parties who enter into covenant marriages will generally be
denied access to an immediate divorce, except for the most egregious con-
duct.' 2 Although this form of marriage does not prevent the divorce that is
inevitable, it does postpone the action until the parties have had adequate
time to attempt reconciliation or until permissible grounds become avail-
able. 3 In addition to the impact which the delay may have upon interper-
sonal relations, such a postponement may have a profound impact on post-
marital support and property interests.'
4
Marriage has always been considered a relationship in which the par-
ties enter with the intent of lifelong commitment. 15 In fact, contracts entered
into before a marriage which express an intent to obtain divorce have been
generally viewed as unenforceable.16 Why then is there a need for covenant
marriage? To whom would such a union be attractive? Apparently, legisla-
tors in some states wish to allow couples, rather than the government, to
have the final say in defining an important aspect of marriage-its perma-
nence.1 7 Any criticism of such a laudable goal may seem unwarranted, but
the problems created by recognizing an additional form of marriage may
ultimately outweigh its utility.
A covenant marriage may be viewed as a premarital contract that evi-
dences not only the present, mutual intent of the parties to be married, but
the common agreement and expectation that such a marriage will endure
under circumstances which would justify legal termination of other mar-
riages.' 8 Although many religious marital vows include language which
expresses lifelong commitment, the covenant marriage transforms state-
ments made before God, family, and friends into a legally binding contract,
enforceable in the state in which the marriage was contracted. 19
11. Id. at 290 (stating "The declaration of intent signed by the prospective spouses after
the counseling restores integrity to the dedicating promise itself; for what we say and mean
shapes the nature and destiny of the marriage.").
12. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and
Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REv. 63, 107-08 (1998).
13. See Raymond C. O'Brien, The Reawakening of Marriage, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 339,
366 (1999).
14. A delay will continue the accumulation of marital property and continue any spousal
support obligation.
15. June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31
Hous. L. REv. 359, 367 (1994).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 (1981).
17. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 882 (2000).
18. See id. at 956.
19. See id. at 958-59.
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This merger of private expectations, religious beliefs, and governmen-
tal interests has produced a new institution, which will likely present numer-
ous legal questions for courts and lawyers, for instance: (1) Are all parties
who are competent to enter into traditional marriage competent for covenant
marriage? (2) May the covenant aspect of a covenant marriage be annulled
without setting aside the marriage itself? (3) To what extent may the parties
strengthen or modify the covenant through premarital agreements? (4) May
changes in state marriage and divorce laws that take place after the covenant
marriage affect the terms of the existing marriage? (5) To what extent will
there be recognition of a covenant marriage outside the state where the mar-
riage was contracted? and (6) May a couple convert a covenant marriage
into a traditional marriage, and if so, may such a conversion take place
without the participation or consent of the state?
This article will discuss the philosophical basis of covenant marriage
and address numerous questions its adoption presents. It will also examine
the approaches to covenant marriage taken in the states that have so far en-
acted covenant marriage statutes-Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas-
considering covenant marriage in the context of longstanding social and
legal principles relating to marriage. The most recent state to adopt covenant
marriage, Arkansas, is both the least considered to date in the literature and
the heir to some of the lessons from Louisiana and Arizona. Its statute will
be most carefully scrutinized to demonstrate the many challenges and prob-
lems inherent in covenant marriage legislation. The article considers the
scholarly literature that has thus far examined covenant marriage, challeng-
ing the assumptions of the authors to date. It concludes with a recognition
that covenant marriage laws may breed serious unintended consequences,
some of which may be avoided by premarital contract, but others which
require scrutiny and reform by both the legislatures and the courts.
II. MARRIAGE AND CONTRACT
Marriage has traditionally been seen as the state's recognition of the
present intent and agreement of a man and woman to live together in a rela-
tionship defined by the state, under rules promulgated by the state which
serve important state interests. 20 Because the relationship so closely resem-
bles a contract at the time of its formation, all too often the nature of this
civil status is improperly subordinated to the premarital expectations of the
21parties. Courts have made it clear, however, that marriage is inextricably
20. David S. Caudill, Legal Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation: A Proposal To
Update and Reconsider Common-Law Marriage, 49 TENN. L. REV. 537, 556-57 (1982).
21. See David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage ": The First Amendment and Mar-
riage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 983 (2001).
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tied to the state and that premarital expectations may not redefine its essen-
tials. 2
2
All marriages are preceded by a contract. 23 The mutual exchange of
promises serves as legally sufficient consideration.24 At common law this
contract was legally enforceable through the action for breach of promise to
marry, with monetary damages awarded for such breach.25 Like all other
contracts, the contract to marry is based upon the mutual consent and capac-
ity of the contracting parties at the time they enter into the relationship.26 An
innocent party may avoid a marriage that takes place when consent is invol-
untary or fraudulently induced.27 Lack of capacity to contract based upon
age or mental condition may also serve as a basis for nonperformance of the
marriage contract.
28
The civil status of marriage is created after execution of the promise to
marry, and at that point the contract is replaced by the three-party relation-
ship consisting of the husband, the wife, and the state. 29 There is no longer a
contract between husband and wife because the state fully defines the terms
of the union, the parties lack the ability to dissolve the relationship without
the consent and involvement of the state, and there are no recoverable dam-
ages arising out of any breach. 30 The state uses the marriage to promote its
vital interests, and although it will acknowledge concern for the expectations
22. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (characterizing marriage as "an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is
the foundation of the family and of society").
23. Seeid.at210.
24. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U.L.
REV. 65, 115 (1998).
25. See, e.g., Wightman v. Coates, 15 Mass. (15 Tyng) 1, 3-4, 6 (1818).
26. See, e.g., Steve Escalera, California Marital Annulments, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 153, 156 (2000).
27. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-201 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
When either of the parties to a marriage is incapable from want of age or under-
standing of consenting to any marriage, or is incapable of entering into the mar-
riage state due to physical causes, or where the consent of either party shall have
been obtained by force or fraud, the marriage shall be void from the time its nul-
lity shall be declared by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Id.
28. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revision of the Law of Marriage: One Baby Step Forward,
48 LA. L. REV. 1131, 1146 (1988); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§14-15
(1979).
29. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888). In Maynard, the Court opined:
It is also to be observed that, whilst marriage is often termed by text writers and
in decisions of courts as a civil contract-generally to indicate that it must be
founded upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious




of the parties, the degree to which the interests of the parties can coexist




Critical to the legal validity of any marriage is the present intent of the
parties to be married.32 This means that each party has a present desire to
assume the rights and responsibilities the state and their religion ascribe to
them through this status.3v Implicit in this is the intent to enter into a rela-
tionship of indefinite duration.34 Despite the fact that individuals may envi-
sion marriage in different ways, the only intent that is relevant to the state is
the intent to enter a marriage that comports with critical state interests.
35
These interests include the intent of the parties to stay married as long as
they possibly can.
The intent necessary to form a covenant marriage goes beyond that
which would be required to create other marriages.36 In this instance, each
party must freely and voluntarily desire to form a union that is not subject to
the same rules as other marriages. They must understand the full legal im-
plications of the marriage, including restrictions that may apply to them re-
garding separation and divorce.37 An informed consent in this instance may
also imply knowledge of grounds for divorce that would be available to
them in the absence of a covenant marriage. An intent to enter into a cove-
nant marriage that is based solely upon pressure coming from family or the
religious community may lack the individualized reflection and considera-
tion sufficient to satisfy statutory requirements for intent.
38
31. See Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the Marital Status of
Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
32. Although present intent to be married is most often identified with common law
marriages, license and solemnization requirements verify intent in ceremonial marriages.
33. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 970 (2000).
34. Catherine T. Smith, Philosophical Models of Marriage and Their Influence on Prop-
erty Division Methods at Divorce, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 214, 215 (2000).
35. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1238, 1241 (1986).
36. Couples entering a covenant marriage are required to document their intent through
the execution of a "declaration of intent," discussed infra Part VII.B. 1.
37. In each state permitting covenant marriage, the parties must attest to the fact that
they have received and read a pamphlet entitled "Covenant Marriage Act," which provides a
full explanation of the terms and conditions of a covenant marriage.
38. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-201 (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (permitting annulment of a
marriage "where the consent of either party shall have been obtained by force or fraud").
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As is the case with all contracts, the requisite intent at the time of for-
mation of a marriage determines validity. 39 Solemnization of marriage has
historically included whatever words or vows the parties wished to express,
but the bottom line has always been the mutual present intent of the parties
to be husband and wife.4 ° It has not been uncommon for marital vows to
convey additional words of commitment which include an intent that only
death will sever the marriage.41 Prior to the advent of absolute divorce, this
intent was fully accommodated and enforced.42 The notion that marriage is a
lifelong relationship did not require support through specific words of assur-
ance, but was understood from the absence of a means for dissolution.43 As
states have liberalized divorce laws, wedding vows that express lifelong
commitment have evolved to carry no legal significance beyond the verifica-
tion of present intent to be married.44
IV. STATE INTERESTS IN COVENANT MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Covenant marriage is the direct result of lawmakers' dissatisfaction
with rising divorce rates and what appears to be a weakening of the institu-
tion.45 It may therefore be viewed as a prophylactic attempt to guard state
interests associated with marriage. Because marriage is viewed as something
that is good and positive for society, contemporary legislative efforts to
lengthen and strengthen marriage have been generally welcomed and have
been seen as conducive to legitimate governmental concerns.46 Covenant
marriage attempts to reconcile a desire to protect the expectations of the
parties with the states' selfish motives for preserving marriage.
Each state's interests are reflected in its marriage and divorce laws.48
Some state interests in marriage, however, are universally shared. In addi-
39. See generally ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 536 (2d ed., West
1960).
40. Dubler, supra note 33, at 970.
41. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84
VA. L. REV. 1225, 1258 (1998).
42. See generally Michele Brewer Brooks, The Biblical View of Marriage: Covenant
Relationship, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 125 (1999); Harvey Couch, The Evolution of Parliamen-
tary Divorce in England, 52 TUL. L. REV. 513 (1978). Absolute divorce recognized the right
of the sovereign to dissolve a marriage and permit one or both parties to remarry.
43. Brooks, supra note 42, at 129.
44. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property
Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2372 (1994).
45. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage? A Change in Culture for the
Sake of the Children, 46 LA. B.J. 116-18 (1998).
46. See generally Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent
Proposals To Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1997).
47. See Bix, supra note 31, at 23.
48. Id. at 29.
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tion to protecting the expectations of the parties, all states are interested in
promoting sexual stability, reducing welfare rolls by promoting economic
support, facilitating procreation while protecting children, and promoting
social relations which provide emotional support for its citizens.49 States
also are aware of the role that marriage plays in providing a political unit
through which they may more effectively govern.50 To the extent that cove-
nant marriage evidences a commitment to stay married, the beneficial con-
sequences of the civil status are promoted.
Among the most important state interests associated with marriage is
the protection of the expectations of the parties at the time they enter into the
union.5' Here the focus is not just on the subjective intent of the parties, but
more importantly from the state's perspective, there is a desire to ensure the
long-term stability of the relationship.52 The state is aware that if the parties
are not linked in a common understanding regarding the critical terms of the
marriage, there is a greater likelihood that marital discord will lead to dis-
ruption or dissolution and therefore frustrate other important state interests.53
For example, most parties enter into a marriage anticipating the ability to
sexually consummate the marriage. By permitting annulment based upon
physical incapacity of a party, the state is not only acknowledging the
breach of the contract underlying the marriage, but also is protecting its own
interest in sexual stability, procreation, the psychological and emotional
well-being of the parties, and economic support of a dependent spouse.54
Covenant marriage places emphasis on the mutual expectation of the
parties that their relationship will endure, a position that is not exactly un-
common for couples entering marriage.55 Beyond highlighting the commit-
ment to stay married and to resolve disputes, covenant marriage does not
deal with specific expectations of the parties concerning marital rights and
responsibilities which may be critical to the fulfillment of its purpose. The
quality of marriage is subsumed by the fact of marriage. This underscores
49. These state interests are reflected in laws and public policy that enforce child sup-
port, prohibit bigamy, presume paternity of a child born during a marriage, and allow couples
to enter into premarital agreements. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish":
Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 771, 779-80 (2001).
50. Marriage facilitates the collection of taxes, the transfer of property, and the distribu-
tion of wealth. The marital unit has served as a way in which the state can generally keep
track of its citizens.
51. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (2001).
52. See Bix, supra note 31, at 7-8.
53. See Sean E. Brotherson & Jeffrey B. Teichert, Value of the Law in Shaping Social
Perspectives on Marriage, 3 J.L. FAM. STUD. 23, 42 (2001).
54. See Wardle, supra note 49, at 781-87.
55. See Regan, supra note 44, at 2372.
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the state's reluctance to address issues of marital cooperation, productivity,
or happiness in the ongoing relation. The position taken in this regard seems
to be "for better or for worse, make it last!"
That a state sets minimum qualifications to enter into marriage demon-
strates the state's concern that the parties are not only capable of possessing
the requisite intent for marriage, but that they can also at least initially con-
summate the marriage in a way that supports the state's vital interests. 56 In
the context of a covenant marriage, qualifications for marriage take on
added significance for the state and for the parties. Certainly, those who are
not qualified to enter into traditional marriage may not contract a covenant
marriage. Any disability reflected in the lack of qualification is exaggerated
in a relationship that is not easily dissolved. Those who choose covenant
marriage should not only be qualified to enter marriage, but their qualifica-
tions must also include the ability to comprehend the unique character of
their union. Because a person's consent to marry may have been initially
defective due to nonage or mental incapacity but may become valid after
removal of the impediment, the validity of the covenant aspect of the mar-
riage may be brought into question years later.57
Annulment serves as the vehicle by which the state permits a party to
show that there was never an execution of the marriage contract due to inef-
fective capacity or consent or that a critical impediment exits that is incon-
sistent with the mutual expectations of the parties. 58 Annulment therefore
centers around the contract analogy and the state's interest in protecting the
integrity of the bargain 9.5 Failure to secure an annulment of a voidable mar-
riage leaves intact a union that may be incompatible with articulated state
interests. Later, this article will specifically address some of the unique legal
problems surrounding annulment of a covenant marriage.
Circumstances may exist which prevent a marriage from satisfying any
critical state interests, and in such cases the marriage will be deemed void ab
56. See Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to "Principles and Prejudice": Marriage and the
Realization That Principles Win over Political Will, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293, 306 (1996)
("Any 'exclusion from marriage' is due to a basic incapacity based on qualification, not indi-
vidual rights.").
57. In most states a marriage due to nonage can only be set aside during the minority of
the underage party. When a minor enters into a covenant marriage, capacity to understand
marital responsibilities and the covenant at the time of the marriage comes into play. Because
the most significant distinction between covenant and traditional marriages lies in grounds
for divorce, and there is no proceeding specifically designed to challenge the covenant, ques-
tions regarding capacity may only arise at that time. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-201
(LEXIS Repl. 2001).
58. Jeanne Louise Carriere, "It's Deja Vu All over Again": The Covenant Marriage Act
in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701, 1729 (1998).
59. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 869 (1994).
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initio.60 When a marriage takes place without dissolution of a previous mar-
riage or within prohibited degrees of kinship, it will be considered invalid
from its inception. 61 In these instances the impediments are so reprehensible
that the parties lack any ability to validate the union.62 Here the state retains
the exclusive authority to define marriage in a way that fundamental values
are not compromised. The distinction between covenant marriage and tradi-
tional marriage becomes irrelevant due to the overriding concerns associated
with such relationships.
While most states share the same interests in the creation of a marriage,
divorce grounds accurately reflect the balance between marriage as a con-
tract and marriage as a civil status. 63 States that allow divorce without con-
sidering the conduct of the parties are showing deference to the contract
analogy which will honor the wishes of a party. 64 These states are acknowl-
edging the indispensable aspect of marital harmony, as defined by either
party, to the fulfillment of state interests. On the other hand, states that focus
upon marital misconduct as proof that the marriage is no longer serving im-
portant state interests are diminishing the value of personal assessment and
focusing upon standards of behavior deemed relevant to these interests.
65
Absolute divorce, which has its roots in the Protestant Reformation,
permits the dissolution of a marriage and the subsequent remarriage to
someone else.66 Traditionally states have considered divorce by looking at
marriage from the perspective of whether it is capable of being salvaged or
whether the marriage is irretrievably broken.67 Evidence probative of this
issue may relate to specific conduct of a party that the state does not deem
acceptable, or one or both of the parties' mere assertion that reconciliation
will not take place.68
60. An agreement void ab initio is defined as "[a] contract [that] is null from the begin-
ning .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1568 (6th ed. 1990).
61. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (relating to incestuous
marriages); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-101 (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (prohibiting bigamous mar-
riages).
62. See Escalera, supra note 26, at 155.
63. See Bix, supra note 31, at 21.
64. Id. at 22.
65. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, A Consideration of Alternatives to Divorce Litigation,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1151.
66. See Gary H. Nichols, Note, Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble
Experiment? 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 397, 399-400 (1999).
67. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 302, 9A U.L.A. 200 (1998); see also Herma
Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56
U. CrN. L. REV. 1 (1987).
68. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.030(3) (West 1997). The Washington
statute provides that:
[I]f the other party denies that the marriage is irretrievably broken the court shall
consider all relevant factors, including the circumstances that gave rise to the fll-
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To the extent that the state requires evidence of a party's conduct,
fault-based divorce is said to exist. When conduct is irrelevant and a party
asserts the existence of irreconcilable differences, no-fault divorce is avail-
able.69 Many states today incorporate both fault and no-fault grounds into
their divorce schemes, allowing the parties to determine the relevance of
marital misconduct to the dissolution.
Before widespread adoption of no-fault divorce, couples would avoid
their state's rigid fault grounds by traveling to a more lenient state or by
manufacturing facts that would justify granting a divorce based on fault.70
Collusion was widespread, and many divorce proceedings were relegated to
theatrical productions. 71 Recognizing that couples desiring a divorce would
find a way to do so, some states began to allow uncontested divorces with-
out corroboration of facts necessary for fault grounds. 72 Ultimately, this
form of divorce became a popular and efficient way for a couple who real-
ized that divorce was inevitable to shed the bonds of matrimony.
No-fault divorce gained widespread acceptance in the 1970s as a result
of: (1) the changed role of women in our society; (2) changed attitudes re-
garding premarital sex and the stigma attached to children born outside of
marriage; (3) dissatisfaction with the cost of fault divorce and its economic
implications for a dependent spouse; (4) a decreased role for religion in de-
fining the nature and incidents of marriage; and (5) growing recognition of
marriage as a partnership in which the cooperation of both parties is neces-
sary to achieve success.7 3 In 1969 California became the first state to enact
no-fault divorce, setting the stage for the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
ing of the petition and the prospects for reconciliation and shall: (a) Make a find-
ing that the marriage is irretrievably broken and enter a decree of dissolution of
the marriage; or (b) At the request of either party or on its own motion, transfer
the cause to the family court, refer them to another counseling service of their
choice, and request a report back from the counseling service within sixty days,
or continue the matter for not more than sixty days for hearing. If the cause is re-
turned from the family court or at the adjourned hearing, the court shall: (i) Find
that the parties have agreed to reconciliation and dismiss the petition; or (ii) Find
that the parties have not been reconciled, and that either party continues to allege
that the marriage is irretrievably broken. When such facts are found, the court
shall enter a decree of dissolution of the marriage.
Id.
69. See Brotherson & Teichert, supra note 53, at 47-48.
70. Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to
Develop in Marriage and at Divorce, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 497 (1987).
71. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
497-521 (2d ed. 1988).
72. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-306(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (stating that "[i]n
uncontested divorce suits, corroboration of plaintiffs grounds for divorce shall not be neces-
sary or required").
73. See Kay, supra note 67, at 5; Erin R. Melnick, Note, Reaffirming No-Fault Divorce:
Supplementing Formal Equality with Substantive Change, 75 IND. L.J. 711, 713 (2000).
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Act's adoption of irretrievable breakdown as the sole basis to dissolve a
marriage. 4
When no-fault divorce was introduced in America, it arrived in two dif-
ferent versions. The first and purer form permits either party to dissolve a
marriage upon an individual assessment that the marriage is irretrievably
broken or that reunification is impossible because of irreconcilable differ-
ences. 75 Under this version of no-fault, a court is in no position to deny ei-
ther party access to divorce and therefore need not consider the conduct of
the petitioner or the period of separation.76 Once other matters have been
resolved, the entire divorce process may only take weeks and involve mini-
mum contact with lawyers or the court.77 The state's interest in complying
with the immediate wishes of the petitioning party outweighs any other con-
sideration.78
A second version of no-fault divorce requires the parties to live sepa-
rate and apart without reconciliation for a statutorily prescribed period that
may range from six months to three years.79 Under this approach the state
wishes to verify the breakdown of the marriage through the fact of physical
separation for an extended period of time.80 The time requirement not only
ensures the irreconcilable nature of the breakup, but also ameliorates the
harshness of divorce proceedings. The state has a vested interest in expedit-
ing divorce by providing sufficient time in advance of any proceedings to
work out details of the post-marital relationship. Once the designated period
has expired, however, the court will treat the marriage as irretrievably bro-
ken and grant a divorce without consideration of marital misconduct. 81
Each state's interests associated with divorce are centered around its in-
terest in marriage. In fault divorce a determination is made that critical state
interests typically associated with marriage are not being served, and there-
fore, little justification exists for continuing such a marriage.82 For example,
adulterous conduct frustrates the state's interest in promoting sexual stability
and avoiding children born out of wedlock. Physical cruelty to a spouse runs
contrary to the state's interest in public peace and safety. When a party to a
74. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 354; see also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 302,
305, 9A U.L.A. 200, 242 (1998).
75. For a general summary of no-fault grounds for divorce, see W. WADLINGTON,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 313-20 (5th ed. 2002).
76. Id.
77. Many states will permit the divorce after a short period of time has elapsed since
filing the petition. Usually this period will not exceed thirty days.
78. See Bix, supra note 31, at 22.
79. See CLARK, supra note 71, at 518-21.
80. Id.
81. ld. at 521.
82. See Bix, supra note 31, at 8.
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marriage engages in such reprehensible conduct, the state is more than will-
ing to let the innocent spouse out of the marriage.
In granting a divorce based upon fault, the state may be interested in:
(1) punishing the guilty party; (2) vindicating and protecting the innocent
spouse; (3) ensuring that the marriage is irretrievably broken; (4) encourag-
ing an appropriate standard of marital conduct; or (5) protecting children of
the marital household.83 In such cases evidence exists which validates the
broken character of the marriage; therefore, the state's primary interest shifts
to protecting those who may be victims of the relationship. Because many of
the basic benefits derived by the state from the marriage have been com-
promised, dissolution is not only permitted, but also, under some circum-
stances, may be encouraged.84
V. MARRIAGE CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS
Despite the fact marriages are not considered contracts, courts have
historically permitted parties contemplating marriage to enter into legally
binding agreements that may have an impact on the ongoing marital rela-
tionship.85 For many years antenuptial or premarital agreements were tools
used by older persons who wished either to preserve property after death for
their children of a previous marriage or to protect such property from the
statutory and common law claims of their future spouse.86 Testamentary
disposition was not completely effective because of the ability of the surviv-
ing spouse to take by dissent from the terms of the will.87 Because such
agreements usually involved older and wealthier individuals, the agreements
did not offend major public policy considerations.88 In fact, because they
removed obstacles to marriages, premarital agreements were encouraged
and viewed favorably by courts.89
Efforts to expand the use of premarital agreements to limit the marital
or post-marital support obligation and to dictate the property interests of the
parties upon the contingency of divorce initially met resistance. 90 Gradually,
courts permitted broader use of premarital agreements, including a determi-
83. See generally Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can
Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55 (1991).
84. A state may actually encourage divorce by permitting a victim spouse to recover
attorney's fees and court costs from an abusing spouse.
85. Richard W. Bartke, Marital Sharing-Why Not Do It by Contract?, 67 GEO. L.J.
1131, 1147-51 (1979) (discussing the history of antenuptial agreements in the United States).
86. See generally CLARK, supra note 71, at 1-20.
87. Id. at 295.
88. Id. at 2.
89. See id. at 8.
90. See generally Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 397,407-09 (1977).
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nation of postmarital spousal support and property division.91 Fundamental
to the enforceability of such agreements was the requirement that they con-
tain fair provisions for a potentially dependent spouse or that there be full
and frank disclosure of the assets of the parties.92 Expanded use of premari-
tal agreements has been precipitated by several factors: (1) the diminished
role of fault in the divorce and alimony determinations; (2) the greater eco-
nomic independence of women; (3) the growing number of "second mar-
riages"; and (4) the advent of equal or equitable division of marital property
upon divorce.93 Because today's courts are interested in expediting divorce
proceedings and are less concerned with issues relating to spousal support or
assigning blame for marital breakdown, premarital agreements serve as use-
ful tools to courts and married couples who wish to clarify their marital and
post-marital, economic, and personal relationships.
The wide latitude given to parties in premarital contracting serves as a
strong justification for covenant marriage. If the state is willing to enforce
promises made before marriage regarding matters that range from the dispo-
sition of property upon divorce to the availability of post-marital support,
why should it not be interested in enforcing the voluntary promise of the
parties to remain married? On the other hand, does the availability of pre-
marital contracting obviate any need for covenant marriage by offering an
alternative means of enforcing commitments emanating from marriage?
Should state involvement be restricted to the enforcement of contracts that
are entered into before the marriage takes place and that adhere to traditional
legal principles affecting premarital agreements?
VI. THE LOUISIANA AND ARIZONA COVENANT MARRIAGE STATUTES
In 1997 Louisiana became the first state to enact a covenant marriage
law.94 In what its proponents characterized as an effort not to eliminate di-
vorce but to strengthen marriage, this new law allowed a couple to insulate
their marriage from many of the traditional fault and no-fault grounds for
divorce by committing themselves to matrimony for life.95 The act set forth
three basic requirements for forming such a marriage: (1) premarital coun-
91. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. 1970) (finding premarital
agreements valid if made under the proper conditions); Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662,
666 (Ga. 1982) (holding premarital agreements are not per se void as against public policy);
Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 815 (Mass. 1981) (upholding a premarital contract).
92. CLARK, supra note 71, at 3.
93. See WADLINGTON, supra note 75, at 520-22.
94. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 2000).
95. See Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step
Toward a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 929
(1998) (citing State Representative Tony Perkins, sponsor of Louisiana's Covenant Marriage
Law).
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seling which emphasizes the significance of marriage and the lifelong com-
mitment being made; (2) execution of a declaration of intent to enter into a
covenant marriage by both parties, which includes an affidavit stating that
they have received premarital counseling and a state pamphlet explaining
the legal implications of such a marriage; 96 and (3) an attestation signed by
the counselor accompanying the parties' affidavit confirming that the appro-
priate counseling was provided.97 Couples entering into a covenant marriage
may not obtain a divorce without consideration of fault, but must comply
with the statute's two-year separation requirement. 98 Even when contemplat-
ing divorce, the statute mandates counseling in an attempt to foster recon-
ciliation.99
The Louisiana covenant marriage law allows for divorce based upon
(1) adultery; (2) felony conviction and subsequent sentence of death or im-
prisonment "at hard labor"; (3) abandonment for one year; (4) sexual abuse
of the spouse or a child of one of the spouses; (5) living separate and apart
for two years; or (6) separate cohabitation after a judgment of separation of
bed and board for: (a) one year, if the marriage produced no children; (b)
eighteen months, if the marriage produced any minor children; or (c) one
year, if the judgment of separation was based on abuse of a minor child of
one of the spouses.100 In addition to the above-stated grounds for divorce,
grounds for legal separation include "habitual intemperance of the other
spouse, or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse, if such
... is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable."'' °
Parties without children who are legally separated and have lived apart
without reconciliation must wait only one year from the time of the legal
96. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1)-(2)(a) (West 2000). The contents of a dec-
laration of intent include the following:
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman
who agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as they both may live.
We have chosen each other carefully and disclosed to one another everything
which could adversely affect the decision to enter into this marriage. We have
received premarital counseling on the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of
marriage. We have read the Covenant Marriage Act, and we understand that a
Covenant Marriage is for life. If we experience marital difficulties, we commit
ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to preserve our marriage, including mari-
tal counseling.
Id.
97. See id § 9:273(A)(2).
98. See id. § 9:307 (West 2000).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Susan Hager, Comment, Nostalgic Attempts To Recapture What Never Was:
Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Act, 77 NEB. L. REV. 567, 576 (1998) (quoting LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:307).
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separation to obtain a divorce. 10 2 When there are minor children from the
marriage, the parties must wait an additional six months.'
0 3
In its first year, covenant marriage was not exactly welcomed with
open arms in Louisiana-only one percent of marriages contracted chose the
covenant option. 1°4 Currently, only about three percent of Louisiana mar-
riages are covenant marriages.'0 5 Proponents of the new law have attributed
its slow start to lack of information and education regarding the desirability
of covenant marriage as an option. 10 6 Opponents may argue that the lack of
popularity is due to the general satisfaction with traditional marriage and the
rejection of the notion that some marriages may not be as secure as others. 0 7
The suspicion with which the people of Louisiana viewed covenant
marriage has not stopped other states from taking a close look at this form of
marriage option. A number of states introduced covenant marriage bills that
were not passed. 0 8 Despite the failure of covenant marriage to take hold in
these states, the Louisiana law has prompted lawmakers in many states to
take a closer look into serious marriage and divorce reform.10 9
The Arizona covenant marriage law, which was enacted in 1998,
closely resembles the Louisiana law enacted a year earlier."0 This statute
permits a couple with the legal capacity to marry to declare their intent to
enter into a covenant marriage and be bound by Arizona law regarding such
marriage. 1 Arizona's provisions relating to premarital counseling and sup-
porting affidavits and documents are identical to those in Louisiana." 2 The
only major differences in the Arizona law appear in the grounds for marital
dissolution. The Arizona covenant marriage statute permits a party to seek a
divorce when the other spouse has habitually used drugs or alcohol, thus
avoiding the period of prolonged separation required in Louisiana." 3 Ari-
zona also permits parties to a covenant marriage to obtain a divorce when
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Christine B. Whelan, No Honeymoon for Covenant Marriage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17,
1998, at A14.
105. Krisy Gashler, Wedded Bliss?, DESERT NEWS (Salt Lake City), Aug. 1, 2002, at C1.
106. See Spaht, supra note 10, at 298.
107. See Melissa Lawton, Note, The Constitutionality of Covenant Marriage Laws, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2502 n.289 (1998) (citing "Super Marriage, " supra note 2).
108. See Nichols, supra note 95, at 973-74 (citing failed attempts to pass bills in Califor-
nia, Mississippi, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia).
109. See id. at 974.
110. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to -906 (West 2000).
111. Id.§25-901.
112. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901, with LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:273(A)(2)(a) (West 2000).
113. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-903(7).
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they mutually agree to do so." 4 This provision is the clearest indication that
Arizona wishes to emphasize the contractual nature of covenant marriage by
recognizing the right of rescission.
In the absence of covenant marriage, no-fault divorce is available in
both Louisiana and Arizona. Obtaining a no-fault divorce in Louisiana re-
quires only a six-month residency period and separation for six months." 5 In
Arizona domicile is required for divorce jurisdiction, but a no-fault divorce
can easily be obtained by showing that the marriage is irretrievably bro-
ken. 6 In both states the ease with which couples could obtain a no-fault
divorce played a major role in legislative decisions to adopt covenant mar-
riage. "7 Covenant marriage was simply viewed as a speed bump to divorce
for couples who wished to have one in place.
VII. THE ARKANSAS COVENANT MARRIAGE STATUTE
A. Legislative History
Identified by the governor as a key 2001 legislative priority, State Rep-
resentative Russ Hunt filed a covenant marriage bill with the Arkansas Gen-
eral Assembly on February 23, 2001. "8 Advocates of the legislation, labeled
as House Bill 2039, cited statistics showing that Arkansas had the third
highest divorce rate nationally, exceeded only by Nevada and Tennessee. 119
They pointed to the fact that Arkansas had a divorce rate of 6.4 per 1000
people in 1998 and asserted that the state government has a direct interest in
preserving marriage because children in broken families often require more
social services, a cost which is borne by taxpayers. 20 Although there was
the stated concern that divorce had become too easy, legislators acknowl-
edged that little interest existed to toughen divorce laws. '
2
'
114. Id. § 25-903(8).
115. LA. Civ. CODEANN. art. 103 (West 1999).
116. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (West 2000).
117. See Kelly Ryan, Super Vows' Aim To Put Marriages to the Test: Louisiana Cove-
nant Measure May Boost Other Efforts To Curb Divorce, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 29,
1997, at Al; see also Maggie Gallagher, Choosing the Ties That Bind, N.Y. POST, May 30,
1998, at 015.
118. See Suzi Parker, Covenant Marriages Near: Arkansas Poised To Approve the Option
for Couples, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 31, 2001, at 33A.
119. See Michael Rowett & Michael R. Wickline, House Passes Bill Allowing Couples
To Enter Covenant: New Contract Meant To Deter Divorce, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Mar. 13, 2001, at B1.
120. Michael Rowett, Bill Would Let Couples Enter Covenant Marriage Contracts, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 2001, at B 1.
121. See Amy Schlesing, '7 Do" Means Forever with Covenant-New Legal Option
Makes Divorce More Difficult To Obtain, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 9, 2001, at B4.
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During debate over this legislation before the General Assembly's City,
County, and Local Affairs Committee, supporters expressed concern that
since the 1960s, divorce had become too accessible in Arkansas, thereby
ignoring the nature of the contractual obligations assumed by the parties.
22
The bill's sponsor compared marriage to buying a house or a car: "[Y]ou
can't get out of it just because you change your mind."'123 Opponents of the
legislation argued that the state should not have an active role in preserving
marriages, and they feared that passage of a voluntary statute could lead to a
mandatory version down the road. 124 Concerns were also expressed that the
law could lead to physical and mental abuse, that the presence of a covenant
marriage and its reconciliation provisions could mean a delay in the issuance
of a protective order, or that those entering into such agreements may be
unable to comprehend all of the legal ramifications of their decision. 25 De-
spite the misgivings expressed by critics of the legislation, House Bill 2039
passed the Arkansas State House of Representatives on March 12, 2001, by
a fifty-seven to thirty-seven vote and later was approved by the Senate.'
26
On August 13, 2001, Act 1486 establishing covenant marriages took ef-
fect.1
27
B. Key Provisions of Act 1486
The Arkansas Covenant Marriage Act of 2001 is virtually identical to
the Louisiana statute described above. It provides that a covenant marriage
is a marriage entered into between a male and a female who understand and
agree that their marriage should be a lifelong relationship. 128 The parties
recognize the significance of marriage and have participated in authorized
counseling, which placed emphasis upon the purposes and responsibilities of
marriage. 29 There is the further recognition that a party should seek a di-
vorce only when there has been a complete and total breach of the marital
covenant.1 30 The couple may contract a covenant marriage by simply "de-
claring their intent to do so on their application for a marriage license...
and executing a declaration of intent to contract a covenant marriage" in a
122. See Michael Rowett, Covenant Marriage Option Endorsed by Panel, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 2001, at A8.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Seth Blomeley, Senate Panel Oks Measure To Let Couples Enter Covenant,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Mar. 23, 2001, at A8.
126. Id.
127. See Diana Jean Schemo, In Covenant Marriage, Forging Ties That Bind, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at A10.
128. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-803(a)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
129. Id. § 9-11-803(a)(2).
130. Id. § 9-11-803(a)(3).
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manner consistent with the statute.1 31 The application for the marriage li-
cense is then filed with the circuit clerk in the office which issues the mar-
riage license. 132
1. Declaration of Intent
The statute requires a couple contemplating covenant marriage to for-
mally declare their intent to do so in a recitation signed by both parties and
submitted with the application for the marriage license.' 33 This declaration
of intent expresses the fact that the parties have agreed to live together as
husband and wife for the remainder of their lives.' 34 It expresses the serious-
ness of the decision to marry and states that the parties have fully disclosed
to one another matters that could adversely affect the decision to enter into
the marriage. 135 This declaration also states that the parties have received
authorized counseling regarding the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of
the marriage; that they both have read the provisions of the Covenant Mar-
riage Act of 2001; and that they understand that a covenant marriage is for
life. 136 The declaration also requires a commitment to make all reasonable
efforts to preserve the marriage in the event of marital difficulties.
37
The declaration of intent includes an agreement by the parties to submit
to the law of the State of Arkansas regarding covenant marriage.'3 8 The dec-
laration is accompanied by an affidavit by the parties that repeats the fact
that they have received authorized counseling pertaining to the seriousness
of covenant marriage and the fact that covenant marriage is a commitment
for life. 139 It must also attest that the parties have received the informational
pamphlet promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts and state
that the couple has been advised of the exclusive grounds for legally termi-
nating a covenant marriage by divorce. 140 This document must then be
signed by both parties before a notary, and if one of the parties is a minor,
written consent must be executed by the person charged by statute with con-
senting to the marriage of a minor.
1 41
The declaration of intent requirement is designed to short circuit claims
that may subsequently be made that the parties either did not desire the
131. Id. § 9-11-803(b)(1).
132. Id. § 9-11-803(b)(2).
133. Id. § 9-11-804(a)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).





139. Id. § 9-11-804(a)(2)(A).
140. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-804(a)(2)(B).
141. Id. § 9-11-804(a)(3)(A)-(B).
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covenant union or did not fully understand the responsibilities of such a
marriage. This document in some ways serves as the premarital contract for
the covenant marriage, with the key consideration being the parties' joint
execution. The contractual analogy is weakened, however, by the fact that
there are no damages for breach and the parties have no right of rescis-
sion. 142
2. Counseling Requirement
Covenant marriage requires that couples be advised of the nature, pur-
poses, and responsibilities of marriage by a person authorized under the
statute. 143 Specifically identified as authorized counselors are priests, minis-
ters, rabbis, clerks from the Religious Society of Friends, clergy members
from any religious sect, licensed professional counselors, licensed associate
counselors, licensed marriage and family therapists, licensed clinical psy-
chologists, or licensed associate marriage and family therapists. 44 This list-
ing of authorized counselors seems designed to offer a couple contemplating
covenant marriage a broad range of options for meeting the statute's re-
quirement. For a couple with ties to a religious congregation, it is likely that
the necessary counseling services can be provided without cost. For those
without such connections, the cost of premarital counseling can be a consid-
erable financial obstacle.
The quality of premarital counseling is not addressed by the statute. 45
In addition to discussing the nature and purposes of marriage, a counselor is
merely required to inform the parties of the grounds for termination of a
covenant marriage and to provide the couple with the informational pam-
phlet developed by the Administrative Office of the Courts. 146 Beyond
knowledge of the grounds for terminating the covenant marriage, an author-
ized counselor is not expected to have specific understanding of any other
legal aspects of covenant marriage. There is also the implied assumption
that counseling both parties at the same time presents no conflict of interest
and, in fact, is preferable. 47 Authorized counselors are not required to be
neutral observers with respect to the desirability of covenant marriage and,
142. Some commentators believe that a breach of contract action may be allowed. See
Brian H. Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALI Principals of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 231, 243 (2001).
143. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-804(a)(1).
144. Id. § 9-11-802(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
145. See, e.g., Spaht, supra note 10, at 290.
146. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-804(2)(B).
147. The statute makes no mention of individual consultation and only includes refer-
ences to the joint actions of the parties.
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in the case of religious clergy, may be ardent advocates who see covenant
marriage as the only spiritually viable option for the parties.
Conspicuously absent from the list of authorized counselors are law-
yers who may be most familiar with the legal and practical ramifications of
covenant marriage. 148 While attorneys play a key role in the negotiation and
execution of premarital contracts that affect marital rights and obligations,
the covenant marriage law makes no mention of the value of seeking inde-
pendent legal counsel. Couples exploring covenant marriage may well be
informed of the grounds for divorce pursuant to such marriages, but may not
know until it is too late what rights they surrender by pursuing the covenant
option.
In addition to premarital counseling, parties to a covenant marriage
must commit to seeking counseling in times of marital difficulty. 4 9 This
statutory requirement again assumes the accessibility of a party to such
counseling and the reasonable possibility that the marriage is indeed sal-
vageable. In some cases the statute may require a person who has been the
victim of extreme physical or sexual abuse to obtain counseling to save the
marriage. A covenant marital partner is unable to avoid what in some in-
stances may be pressured reconciliation because the statute calls for marital
counseling before divorce or judicial separation.
3. Conversion of an Existing Marriage
The statute permits couples who are already married to convert their
marriages into a covenant marriage. 50 Conversion may be accomplished by
a couple submitting their marriage license and executing a declaration of
intent to designate their marriage as a covenant marriage, with the accompa-
nying affidavit, to the officer who issues marriage licenses in the county
where they are domiciled.' 5' The declaration of intent must meet the same
requirements for couples initially entering into marriage. 52 The affidavit of
the parties must state that they have discussed their intent to designate their
marriage as a covenant marriage and that they have received counseling
regarding this decision. 53 It must also certify that they have discussed "the
obligation to seek marital counseling in times of marital difficulty and the
exclusive grounds for legally terminating a covenant marriage by di-
vorce."
154
148. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-802(1).
149. Id. § 9-11-804(a)(2)(A).
150. Id. § 9-11-807 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
151. Id. § 9-11-807(a)-(b).
152. See id. § 9-11-807(c).
153. Id. § 9-11-807(c)(1)(B).
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-807(c)(1)(B).
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Ostensibly the least offensive application of covenant marriage arises
in situations when a couple who have been married for some time, and fully
understand their relationship, wish to accentuate their union by professing
lifelong commitment. When this decision is freely and voluntarily made
with full knowledge of what is at stake, there seems to be little basis for not
enforcing such a decision. On the other hand, when the decision to convert a
traditional marriage to a covenant marriage is caused by religious or family
pressure, or is made based upon incomplete or inaccurate information, con-
version becomes problematic.
Because covenant marriage may restrict divorce to fault grounds where
many of the common law defenses apply, conversion to covenant marriage
may present difficult factual and legal problems. There may be a question
surrounding the relevance of facts supporting grounds or defenses that may
have occurred before the conversion. For example, assume that a wife learns
after a conversion to a covenant marriage that her husband had an affair
many years earlier. Should this fact have been disclosed prior to the cove-
nant marriage, and therefore, the wife's consent to the conversion be consid-
ered ineffective? Should the wife's consent to the covenant marriage consti-
tute condonation for marital misconduct occurring before the covenant?
Should a divorce based upon the pre-covenant adulterous conduct be al-
lowed? There is currently no clear answer to these questions, and courts in
Arkansas will undoubtedly be challenged by the issues presented.
A question may arise as to whether an effective conversion to covenant
marriage has taken place or whether the parties properly fulfilled the statu-
tory requirements. Because there is no ceremony or public renewal of vows,
verification of mutual consent rests in the written documents filed and the
attestation of the authorized counselor. The only physical evidence of the
conversion to covenant marriage is the declaration of intent that is filed in
the county where the parties are initially domiciled. Although the couple
may have executed the document, there is no formal state certification that
the couple's marital status has in any way changed and no court order indi-
cating as much. Further, when there has been an ex parte or bilateral divorce
in which the covenant marriage status is not presented to the court, a ques-
tion regarding the validity of the divorce may arise in subsequent proceed-
ings.
4. Divorce Within a Covenant Marriage
A couple who has entered into a covenant marriage may not seek a di-
vorce until they have obtained authorized counseling. 55 Grounds for such a
divorce will be limited to: (1) the other spouse committing adultery; (2) the
155. Id. § 9-11-808(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
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other spouse committing a felony or other infamous crime; (3) the other
spouse physically or sexually abusing the spouse seeking the legal separa-
tion or divorce, or physically or sexually abusing a child of one of the
spouses; (4) the spouse living separate and apart continuously without rec-
onciliation for a period of two years; or (5) the spouses have been living
separate and apart continuously without reconciliation for a period of two
years from the date a judgment of judicial separation was signed.1 56 When
there are minor children of the marriage, the parties must live separate and
apart continuously without reconciliation for a period of two years and six
months from the date of a judgment of judicial separation to obtain a di-
vorce. 157 If, however, one of the spouses has abused a child in the house-
hold, a judgment of divorce may be obtained if the spouses have been living
separate and apart for a period of only one year from the date of the judg-
ment of judicial separation.5
Arkansas law permits parties to a traditional marriage to dissolve or set
aside the union when either party at the time of the marriage was and still is
impotent, thereby providing an ameliorative alternative to annulment.1 59
Because this ground is unavailable in covenant marriage, an annulment,
which may divest an innocent party of property rights or support is the only
option to someone attempting to escape a marriage made impossible due to
physical incapacity. There is no distinction made in covenant and traditional
divorces regarding grounds based upon the conviction of a felony or other
infamous crime, and an immediate divorce may be obtained in either in-
stance when there is physical abuse of a spouse. 60 The covenant marriage
does not, however, allow for a divorce based upon drug addiction or habit-
ual drunkenness for one year, but covenant marriage does recognize judicial
separation on this basis.
1 61
Historically, the most popular ground for divorce in Arkansas has been
based upon an individual offering "indignities to the person of the other as
shall render his or her condition intolerable."' 62 This form of mental cruelty
will not be sufficient to allow for immediate divorce in a covenant marriage,
but like the habitual drunkenness ground, will permit a judicial separation
156. Id. § 9-11-808(a)(1)-(5)(A).
157. Id. § 9-11-808(a)(5)(B)(i).
158. Id. § 9-11-808(a)(5)(B)(ii).
159. See id. § 9-12-301(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (allowing for divorce based upon physical
incapacity).
160. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(2)-3) (permitting divorce "[w]here either party
... shall be guilty of such cruel and barbarous treatment as to endanger the life of the other").
161. See id. § 9-12-301(3) (allowing divorce "[w]here either party shall be addicted to
habitual drunkenness for one (1) year"); see also id. § 9-11-808(b)(5)(A).
162. See id. § 9-12-301(3) (providing for divorce "[w]here either party ... shall offer
such indignities to the person of the other as shall render his or her condition intolerable").
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that can be converted into a divorce after two years. 163 In the context of an
uncontested divorce, this ground has sometimes been confused with no-
fault. The ambiguity and breadth of conduct that has supported a divorce of
this nature has made it a convenient ground in uncontested proceedings in
which factual detail is unnecessary 64
Immediate divorce based upon adultery remains available in both
covenant and traditional marriage.165 Because adultery is a traditional fault
ground for divorce and is inconsistent with most state interests in marriage,
the victim spouse is permitted the option to pursue divorce in spite of any
commitment to marriage for life. Enforcing the covenant would be tanta-
mount to sanctioning extra-marital affairs.
Unique to covenant marriages is the specific identification of spousal
and child sexual abuse as a ground for divorce. 166 Although sexual abuse of
a spouse may certainly be included in either the definition of "cruel and bar-
barous treatment" or" indignities to the person of the other," covenant mar-
riage is the only specific instance in which Arkansas permits a divorce based
upon sexual or physical abuse of a child of either party to the marriage.
1 67
This new ground for divorce which is specially tailored for covenant mar-
riages may have been created to deal with the extreme mental cruelty that
naturally accompanies knowledge that a partner is engaged in such repre-
hensible conduct toward children of the marital household or may simply be
a means to protect children during what would otherwise be a prolonged
period of separation without divorce. Regardless of the reason for its asso-
ciation with covenant marriages, there seems little justification for not spe-
cifically including such conduct as a ground for divorce in any marriage.
Omitted as grounds for divorce in a covenant marriage is a divorce
which is generally permitted when either spouse is legally obligated to sup-
port the other, has the ability to provide the other with the common neces-
saries of life, but willfully fails to do so.' 68 Elimination of willful non-
support as a basis for dissolving a covenant marriage offers a supporting
spouse a way to avoid immediate distribution of marital property, and it
places the burden on the taxpayer to support an abandoned dependent
spouse.
163. Id. § 9-11-808(b)(5)(C).
164. See id. § 9-12-306(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (providing "[i]n uncontested divorce suits,
corroboration of plaintiff's grounds for divorce shall not be necessary or required").
165. See id. §§ 9-11-808(a)(1), 9-12-301(4).
166. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-808(a)(3).
167. See id §§ 9-11-808(a)(3), 9-12-301(3).
168. Id. § 9-12-301(7).
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Covenant marriage was in large part enacted to address the concern for
hasty divorces arising out of state laws permitting no-fault divorce. 169 The
only instance in which Arkansas permits divorce in covenant marriages
without any consideration of fault occurs when the parties have been living
separate and apart continuously for eighteen months without cohabitation.
170
Because parties to a covenant marriage may obtain a no-fault divorce when
they have been living separate and apart for two years without reconcilia-
tion, the practical significance of the-covenant marriage in the context of
divorce without fault is a six-month delay. With this minimal difference in
period of separation, the sense of urgency stemming from Louisiana's and
Arizona's quick no-fault divorce grounds does not seem to be the basis for
the Arkansas covenant marriage statute. If indeed the proliferation of di-
vorce serves as the principal justification for covenant marriage in Arkansas,
it is the concern regarding hasty divorces based upon fault that serves as the
overriding consideration.
The Arkansas covenant marriage law introduces a new proceeding that
recognizes covenant spouses' rights to seek a judicial separation. 171 This
provision, although similar to the statute that permits a divorce from bed and
board, allows a party to a covenant marriage to seek a judicial separation in
lieu of absolute divorce, pursuant to specific grounds which differ somewhat
from the previously mentioned divorce grounds. After obtaining authorized
counseling, a spouse to a covenant marriage may seek a judicial separation
based upon: (1) adultery committed by the other spouse; (2) the commission
of a felony or capital offense by the other spouse; (3) the physical or sexual
abuse of the spouse or a child of the spouse seeking the legal separation; (4)
the spouses living separate and apart continuously without reconciliation for
two years; or (5) the other spouse being addicted to habitual drunkenness for
one year, guilty of such cruelty and barbarous treatment as to endanger the
life of the other, or offering indignities to the person of the other as to render
his or her condition intolerable. 1
72
5. Interspousal Immunity
In an attempt to minimize disruptive legal proceedings during mar-
riage, the covenant marriage statute reinstated common law interspousal tort
immunity. Couples who have entered into a covenant marriage may not sue
each other except in actions relating to contracts, restitution of separate
property, judicial separation in the covenant marriage, annulment, divorce,
169. See Katherine Shaw Spaht & Symeon C. Symeonides, Covenant Marriage and the
Law of Conflicts of Laws, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1085, 1088 (1999).
170. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(5).




and actions relating to spousal support for the support or custody of a child
while the parties are living separate and apart.' 73 The statute is unclear as to
whether the immunity prohibits causes of action accruing during, but
brought after a covenant marriage, and thus merely requires a judicial sepa-
ration before legal action can be maintained. The statute effectively pre-
cludes causes of action based upon either intentional or unintentional torts
while the parties continue to cohabit.
This statutory change may have produced a result contrary to legisla-
tive intent, and certainly inconsistent with prior case law in Arkansas. For
almost a century, the Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized a victim
spouse's right to bring a cause of action against an offending spouse for
intentional torts committed during the marriage. 174 The same court has also
permitted causes of action in negligence between marital partners. 175 In ab-
rogating both forms of common law spousal immunity, the court has repu-
diated the goal of preserving marital harmony. 176 Unless the Arkansas Di-
rect Action Statute 177 can be expanded to include actions against individual
policies, the chief beneficiary of tort immunity in a covenant marriage may
be the liability insurance carrier. By limiting judicial separation as the only
right of an injured spouse to recover damages for injuries sustained at the
hands of the other spouse, covenant marriage may actually be encouraging
divorce.
173. See id. § 9-11-809(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
174. See Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 177, 186 S.W. 832, 836 (1917).
175. See Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 601, 300 S.W.2d 15, 17 (1957).
176. See id. at 600, 300 S.W.2d at 16.
The chief reason relied upon by all these courts, however, is that personal tort
actions between husband and wife would disrupt and destroy the peace and har-
mony of the home, which is against the policy of the law. This is on the bald
theory that after a husband has beaten his wife there is a state of peace and har-
mony left to be disturbed; and that if she is sufficiently injured or angry to sue
him for it, she will be soothed and deterred from reprisals by denying her the le-
gal remedy-and this even though she has left him or divorced him for that very
ground, and though the same courts refuse to find any disruption of domestic
tranquility if she sues him for a tort to her property, or brings a criminal prosecu-
tion against him. If this reasoning appeals to the reader, let him by all means
adopt it.
Id., 300 S.W.2d at 16 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 101 (2d ed. 1955).
177. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210 (LEXIS Repl. 1999) (providing for a direct cause
of action against a liability insurer where the insured is not subject to tort suit).
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6. Jurisdiction over Divorce and Separation
Any Arkansas court having jurisdiction to grant the divorce of a tradi-
tional marriage has jurisdiction to dissolve a covenant marriage.' 78 Jurisdic-
tion to grant a divorce is based upon sixty days residence in the state by
either party prior to the commencement of the proceedings, and therefore,
actual domicile need not be established. 179 A party to a covenant marriage
may leave the state without affecting the Arkansas court's jurisdiction to
respect the other party's rights as they relate to divorce. 80 Even if both par-
ties at some point leave the state, covenant marriage restrictions will apply
if jurisdiction is sought in another state to dissolve the marriage. 18' Grounds
for granting a divorce must have either occurred in the state or serve as a
basis for divorce in this state. 182 Facts supporting such grounds must have
occurred within five years of the filing of the action for divorce. 83 This
five-year limitation carries with it added significance in the context of di-
vorce limited to extreme marital misconduct. Therefore, courts may not
consider actual physical abuse that occurred more than five years prior to a
threat of more abuse in granting a divorce from a covenant marriage.
An action for judicial separation within a covenant marriage may take
place in any court competent to preside over divorce proceedings so long as
one or both of the spouses are domiciled in the state and the ground justify-
ing the action was committed or occurred in the state, or while the matrimo-
nial domicile was in the state.' 84 The domicile requirement, which is not
present for divorce, seems to be in recognition of the continuing role of the
court after granting the order to facilitate reconciliation or to consider the
merits of a subsequent divorce. The action for judicial separation may be
brought if the ground occurred elsewhere while either or both of the spouses
178. Id. § 9-11-809(b)(1).
179. See id. § 9-12-307(a)-(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2002). The statute provides:
The word "residence" as used in subsection (a) of this section is defined to mean
actual presence and upon proof of that the party alleging and offering the proof
shall be considered domiciled in the state, and this is declared to be the legisla-
tive intent and public policy of the State of Arkansas.
Id. § 9-12-307(b).
180. Id. § 9-12-307(a). The Arkansas statute merely requires residence in the state by
either the plaintiff or the defendant for sixty days prior to the commencement of the proceed-
ings.
181. See Feigenbaum v. Feigenbaum, 210 Ark. 186, 190, 194 S.W.2d 1012, 1013 (1946).
Although no mention is made in the covenant marriage statute of the effect of both parties
leaving the state, the Arkansas Supreme Court has always held that jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage belonged in the state where the marriage was celebrated. Id. at
188-90, 194 S.W. at 1012-13.
182. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-307(a)(2).
183. Id. § 9-12-307(a)(3).
184. Id. § 9-11-809(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
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were domiciled elsewhere, so long as the person obtaining the judicial sepa-
ration was domiciled in the state of Arkansas prior to the time the cause of
action accrued and is domiciled at the time the action is filed.1"5 This provi-
sion seems to allow an Arkansas court to order judicial separation based
upon out-of-state conduct when a couple enters into a covenant marriage in
the state, they move elsewhere, and then either party returns to the state as a
domiciliary.
VIII. ANNULMENT OF A COVENANT MARRIAGE
None of the covenant marriage laws enacted to date specifically men-
tion annulment, and there appears to be no variance from the procedure for
setting aside traditional marriages.86 Because covenant marriages make
divorce more restrictive, it may be anticipated that a covenant partner who
wishes to avoid the long waiting period may seek to annul the marriage for
one of the several causes set forth in the statute. Certainly a union based
upon a misrepresentation of a material fact that goes to the essentials of
marriage may be set aside for fraud.' 87 When a party induces another to
enter into a covenant marriage based upon strong religious convictions that
are not in fact held, and when upon discovery of the fact the other party
repudiates the marriage, a court may grant an annulment if the petitioner can
sufficiently prove to the court continuation of the marriage is impossible.1
88
An annulment under these circumstances would avoid the usually required
two-year separation for divorce.
Like other marriages, covenant marriages may be set aside when one
or both of the parties are below the statutorily mandated age of consent,
with or without parental consent. 189 Such marriages may be annulled by the
underage party or his or her parents during the period of minority.' 90 Cove-
nant marriage laws permit marriages between underage parties with parental
consent. 19 Presumably parents must consent to both the marriage and the
covenant. Parental involvement in all the steps necessary to create a cove-
nant marriage, including counseling, appears essential. The failure to com-
ply with the covenant marriage law in this fashion may inhibit enforcement
185. Id. § 9-11-809(b)(1)(B).
186. See, e.g., id § 9-12-202 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
187. See Shatford v. Shatford, 214 Ark. 612, 616, 217 S.W.2d 917, 920 (1949).
188. See, e.g., Bilowit v. Dolitsky, 304 A.2d 774 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1973) (allowing
an annulment based upon fraud for the misrepresentation of his religious beliefs).
189. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-104 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
190. See Hood v. Hood, 206 Ark. 1057, 1062, 178 S.W.2d 670, 673 (1944).
191. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-804(a)(3)(B) (LEXIS Repl. 2002) ("If one (1) or
both of the parties are minors, the written consent or authorization of those persons required
under this chapter to consent to or authorize the marriage of minors.").
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of the covenant, but the marriage itself could remain intact. 92 Further com-
plicating the matter is the fact that underage marriages that are not set aside
during minority may not be attacked by anyone.' 93 The covenant, however,
could theoretically be challenged at any time based upon a lack of under-
standing or coercion existing at the time of the formation of the marital con-
tract.
IX. RESCINDING THE COVENANT
Covenant marriage laws generally provide no means by which a couple
can vitiate the covenant while leaving the marriage intact. Despite the fact
that such laws permit parties to traditional marriages to convert their mar-
riages to a covenant marriage, with the exception of the Arizona law cited
earlier, no consideration is given to a process by which the parties to a
covenant marriage may bilaterally abandon the covenant. The severability
of the covenant from the marriage may arise when parties to a covenant
marriage acknowledge their dissatisfaction with the arrangement and mutu-
ally wish to rescind the covenant so that their marriage may adhere to prin-
ciples embodied in traditional marriage. Perhaps they were too young to
understand the full implications of covenant marriage, or perhaps they were
pressured or persuaded by others. In any event, the decision may be consid-
ered irrevocable.
The nonmodifiable character of covenant marriage accentuates the fact
that the state is not only an indispensable party to the marriage, it has a di-
rect stake in enforcement of the covenant, even under circumstances when
the parties are unwilling. What may have begun as a private, personal, or
religious decision has in effect become an imposition by the state that binds
a couple to a choice that upon reflection was ill-conceived or ill-advised.
X. SUPPLEMENTING THE COVENANT
Although these statutes are silent regarding the relationship that other
agreements may have to a cbvenant marriage, there seems to be room for
premarital negotiation. Prior to entering a covenant marriage, a couple may
wish to execute a premarital agreement which may strengthen the covenant
by providing economic or other relief in the event of a breach. As pointed
out earlier, covenant marriage merely postpones divorce, and eventually the
parties may have to deal with issues of property division, alimony, and child
support. By addressing these matters in a marriage contract that imposes
harsh penalties for unilateral separation or marital misconduct, the parties
192. See Spaht, supra note 12, at 94.
193. See CLARK, supra note 71, at 95-96.
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can effectively close some of the loopholes that are evident in such mar-
riages.
Premarital agreements may be particularly useful to covenant marriage
partners who wish to stipulate in advance the consequences of physical or
legal separation. A couple may wish to designate in advance the person who
will conduct marital counseling when needed. They may also want to estab-
lish a procedure for mediation and dispute resolution. Because divorce may
not occur until years after the parties physically separate, an agreement
could resolve important legal disputes during the interim.
As stated earlier in the context of divorce, the terms of the premarital
agreement may be designed to actually deter separation. For example, the
agreement may provide for the forfeiture of marital property by a spouse
who, without good cause, abandons the marital home. A provision of this
nature would not only discourage abandonment, but also impose a severe
penalty upon a spouse attempting to satisfy the statutory period for living
separate and apart. Such a provision would also create an obstacle for a
spouse who attempts to procure a divorce in another state.
Finally, parties may desire to execute a premarital agreement that will
allow them to set aside the covenant when they mutually agree to do so. As
stated earlier, the Arkansas Covenant Marriage Act does not provide for
rescission of covenant marriage, and a court may find such a provision void
as against public policy. Allowing a couple to avoid voluntarily sought, but
state-imposed obligations through agreement may be viewed as undermin-
ing legislative authority.
XI. PORTABILITY OF THE COVENANT
One question that frequently arises in the context of covenant marriage
is whether another state is obligated to restrict access to divorce to a party
who is a participant in a covenant marriage. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution demands recognition of a judgment
or order of another state even though the law upon which the judgment was
founded is inconsistent with the laws or public policy of the forum.' 9 4 While
a divorce decree rendered in a sister state is entitled to the full faith and
credit of the Constitution, the decision to recognize a marriage brings into
play a choice of law question that emphasizes an examination of competing
state interests.195 In determining the validity of a marriage, courts will gen-
erally look to the law of the state where the marriage was celebrated.'
96
194. Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Mar-
riages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 307, 321 (1998).
195. Id. at 330.
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1969).
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Only when the marriage is contrary to the law of the domicile of the parties
and offends some strong public policy should a court refuse to recognize its
validity.
1 97
Because covenant marriage carries significant legal consequences for
divorce, the real controversy arises regarding grounds and jurisdiction for
marital dissolution. As stated earlier, each state is free to adopt its own
grounds for divorce based upon what it perceives as its important interests.
A state that does not wish to recognize divorce restrictions for covenant
marriages cannot be compelled to do so. Because divorces are permitted to
be ex parte proceedings, a party to a covenant marriage may merely flee to
another jurisdiction and obtain a no-fault divorce. The foreign divorce de-
cree would then, assuming domicile had been established, be entitled to full
faith and credit, even in the state in which the covenant marriage was cele-
brated. 198
A couple domiciled in Texas, a state that does not provide for covenant
marriage, may procure such a marriage in Arkansas, and such a marriage
will be valid everywhere. Although the marriage itself will be recognized,
the covenant aspect of the relationship should apply only in Arkansas, or
possibly in another state that recognizes covenant marriage. Of course if a
party seeks a divorce in Louisiana, the question remains whether a Louisi-
ana covenant marriage is the same as an Arkansas covenant marriage. Be-
cause grounds for divorce differ in the two states, it is clear that any under-
standing of the implications of covenant marriage that existed at the time of
the marriage would no longer be applicable.
XII. ARGUMENTS FAVORING COVENANT MARRIAGE
Advocates of covenant marriage identify as its principal goal the
strengthening of marriage in the interest of children.' 99 By imposing specific
obligations to seek premarital counseling, requiring the parties to execute a
legally enforceable agreement to make reasonable efforts to resolve marital
disputes that threaten the marriage, and limiting divorce to instances of seri-
ous misconduct or prolonged separation, it is felt that marriage has its best
chance to succeed.200 Placing couples in an adversarial position ran contrary
to the states' interest in stable families, and "requiring one parent to put the
other on trial unnecessarily harmed the children" of the marriage. 20' This
argument presumes that too many marriages fail because couples contem-
197. Id.
198. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
199. See Spaht, supra note 12, at 74.
200. Id. at 75.
201. Kurt X. Metzmeier, The Power of an Incompetent Adult To Petition for Divorce
Through a Guardian or Next Friend, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 949, 953 (1995).
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plating marriage fail to fully comprehend the magnitude of the commitment
they are about to make. It also assumes that couples all too often fail to take
steps to preserve rocky marriages and act in haste to obtain a divorce, leav-
ing children as the principal victims. Finally, this position considers grounds
for divorce that allow speedy dissolution without full consideration of mari-
tal fault as being an impediment to long-term family stability.
Proponents of covenant marriage also point to the revival of religious
influence as a positive force in promoting and preserving marriage. 20 2 The
expertise that can be provided by clergy of various faiths has been largely
ignored by states wishing to stem the tide of rising divorce rates. These in-
dividuals have the time and ability to provide premarital counseling and
assist in out-of-court dispute resolution through services that can be pro-
vided at minimal cost to the parties and to the state.20 3 Religious leaders are
said to provide the moral authority necessary for a full understanding of
marital rights and responsibilities, as well as a calming influence upon the
parties that may not be available when acting through secular authorities.
204
Finally, covenant marriage is seen as an opportunity to protect and re-
ward non-divorcing spouses as the individuals who have been loyal to the
relationship by placing in their hands the decision as to when a divorce is
appropriate. 20 5 It fosters acceptable marital behavior by not offering divorce
as a way out for those who ignore the responsibilities of the status. 2" A
spouse who has committed adultery or engaged in physical or sexual abuse
is denied divorce until the statutory period of separation has expired, thus
elevating the negotiating position of the innocent spouse.
To supporters, the heart of covenant marriage is its voluntary character.
An individual agrees to participate in covenant marriage for reasons that
may be quite personal and that have little to do with state sponsorship. The
state is viewed as merely a means by which the private interests and wishes
of the parties may be enforced. Covenant marriage allows a couple to more
truly believe the vows they make at the altar.
XIII. CRITICISM OF COVENANT MARRIAGE
Ostensibly there seems to be little objection to a couple's willingness
to express a lifelong commitment to their marriage, but there are those who
see covenant marriage as a threat to individual freedom and an entangle-
202. Spaht, supra note 12, at 75.
203. Id. at 76.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 78.
206. Id. at 79.
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207
ment of government in religion. By primarily focusing upon limiting di-
vorce, covenant marriage rejects many of the assumptions which form the
foundation of no-fault divorce. Among the more prominent of these
assumptions is the notion that the enforced continuation of a marriage in
which either party views reconciliation as impossible will serve neither the
state nor the parties well. In fact, prolonging marriage in which divorce is
inevitable likely exacerbates the discord thereby leading to a more conten-
tious divorce and complicated settlement negotiations.20 8 Further, postpon-
ing divorce may lead to uncertainty for the parties and children of the
household. Neither party to the failed marriage can immediately pursue a
new, stronger relationship that could be in the best interest of all concerned.
Because the decision to enter into a covenant marriage is made at a
time when love is at its apex and marital misconduct that might lead to di-
vorce seems incomprehensible, there is some concern that such a decision
can never be considered an arm's length transaction. 20 9 Unlike premarital
agreements that are favored because they remove obstacles to marriage, a
declaration of intent to enter into a covenant marriage is sometimes seen as
merely redundant to the matrimonial vows every couple makes.210 Any mar-
riage can be viewed as a covenant, and the law merely creates a more re-
strictive covenant. The parties utilize the covenant marriage law in anticipa-
tion of a possible breach of the covenant. This hardly seems consistent with
the mutual understanding of marriage as a lifelong relationship.
By sanctioning covenant marriage, the state has in effect established
two distinct categories of marriage, which may lead to the false impression
that couples who enter one form are somehow "more married," and thus
entitled to greater protection than those who enter into traditional mar-
riage. 211 Rather than being enabling, covenant marriage creates disabilities
which deny its participants the full range of customary marital prerogatives.
By restricting divorce to circumstances involving the most serious forms of
marital and moral misconduct, a victim spouse must endure substantial
abuse before there is recognition that the marriage has failed.212 The two-
207. See Adam Pertman, Making Breaking up Harder To Do: States Attempt To Cut
Rates of Divorce and Its Many Social Costs, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2001, at E2.
208. See H.J. Cummins, Are Covenant Marriages Going To Keep More Couples To-
gether?, STUART NEWs/PORT ST. LucIE NEWS, Jan. 16, 2000, at F9; see also Jason Andrew
Macke, Of Covenants and Conflicts: When "I Do" Means More Than It Used To, but Less
Than You Thought, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1377, 1387 (1998).
209. See Silbaugh, supra note 24, at 111.
210. Macke, supra note 208, at 1388.
211. See Courtenay Edelhart, A Call to Matrimony: Efforts Focus on Promoting Lifetime
Commitment, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 10, 2002, at IJ.
212. See Marilyn Werber Serafini, Get Hitched, Stay Hitched, 34 NAT'L J. 694 (2002).
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year period of living separate and apart before a divorce is obtained may
also produce economic and psychological hardship.21 3
Covenant marriage is also viewed by some as state enforcement of re-
ligious vows. 214 Although the law clearly does not limit covenant marriages
to religious ceremonies performed under the auspices of a church, it is clear
that much of the impetus for the law came from clergy and parishioners who
sought legal support for religious beliefs.21 5 A clear indication of the role of
the church in the new law is demonstrated in provisions regarding premari-
tal and pre-divorce counseling requirements. Specifically identifying clergy
as appropriate counselors for couples contemplating covenant marriage, the
law makes the church an active participant in many couples' marriage
choice. 216 It is feared that the heavy weight of moral influence by religious
counselors will not serve the function of an independent, objective influence
in the covenant marriage decision.
Perhaps the strongest criticism of covenant marriage is that it is a re-
flection of the state's unwillingness or lack of fortitude regarding serious
divorce reform.2 1 7 The concerns that marriage is no longer taken seriously
and that divorce is too easily obtained have justified adoption of this new
form of marriage, which subverts the need for meaningful divorce reform. 218
Rather than acknowledging disenchantment with no-fault divorce and re-
turning to longer waiting periods for all divorces, a few states have elected
213. See Mark O'Keefe, Now Armed with Research, Governments Take Another Crack at
Murphy Brown, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERV., July 26, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Newhouse News Service File.
214. See Lawton, supra note 107, at 2508.
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") takes another liberal view, argu-
ing that covenant marriage laws are an impermissible joinder of church and state
insofar as the legislation incorporates Christian values into law. The ACLU as-
serts that the term "covenant" has biblical connotations and promotes marriages
found in the Bible, complete with a dominant husband and submissive wife. In-
deed, the original legislation was proposed by a Promise Keeper, and graduate of
Liberty University. In addition, leaders of certain faiths in Louisiana have en-
couraged covenant over standard marriages, with some having announced plans
to refuse to hold non-covenant marriages in their churches or to preside over
standard marriages if held elsewhere.
Id
215. Id.
216. See Macke, supra note 208, at 1389.
217. Nichols, supra note 66, at 442.
In most states, bills seeking simply to return to some sort of fault requirement for
divorce were swiftly defeated or stalled in committee hearings. Round one of the
divorce counterrevolution had failed. The positive law was not truthful. If a so-
ciety's values must be accurately reflected by positive family law, then any re-
turn to a fault-based system was doomed to fail.
Id.
218. See id. at 441-42.
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to shift the responsibility to couples at a time when they are most naive and
vulnerable to marital ideals rather than marital reality. 219 Covenant marriage
has therefore been used as a way to politically accommodate religious
groups that are calling for a return to traditional family values without up-
setting those who fear a return to an era of marital enslavement.22 °
As stated earlier, covenant marriage is designed to curb divorce by re-
instating fault as the preferred basis by which marriages are dissolved.
Some argue that those who choose covenant marriage are among the lowest
risk for divorce in the first place.221 Even if this alternative becomes popu-
lar, covenant marriage may not accomplish its intended purpose. Divorce
rates in this country began to climb long before the adoption of no-fault.222
Nationally, statistical data indicates that divorce rates have been stable or
declining since 1981.223 Any real growth in the popularity of divorce may
be more attributable to changes in cultural norms, which may include the
disintegration of the stigma associated with divorce, the economic inde-
pendence of women, and the general notion that a couple should be free to
define the terms of their own relationship.224 It is ironic that the same free-
doms that have led to an increased number of divorces are now at the heart
of arguments for covenant marriage.
XIV. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
John and Jane, two Arkansas residents, were devoutly religious mem-
bers of the Church of Eternal Bliss. They had grown up in the church to-
gether and had little social contact outside of their religious community.
When they both had reached the age of eighteen, they informed the minister
of the church of their desire to marry. He emphasized the rigid teachings of
the church, which did not condone divorce in any fashion, and pointed out
to the couple that marriage within the church is considered a sacrament to
God and a lifelong commitment to one another. He further indicated that he
would be unwilling to perform any marriage ceremony unless the couple
demonstrated their commitment through covenant marriage. Realizing that
they must choose covenant marriage to remain in good standing with the
church, their families, and their friends, the couple proceeded in accordance
219. See John Greiner, Covenant Marriage Plan Faulted, State Senator Called "Anti-
family," DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 20, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, The Daily
Oklahoman File.
220. See Amy L. Stewart, Covenant Marriage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L.
REV. 509, 514 (1999).
221. See Gashler, supra note 105, at Cl.
222. Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence
of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3 (2000).
223. Id. at 4.
224. Id. at 5-6.
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with the covenant marriage law. Their minister signed the appropriate form
as the couple's authorized counselor.
Ten years and two children later John has left the Church of Eternal
Bliss and is now a member of the Church of the Here and Now. Economic
hardship and constant arguments have caused marital strain that is having an
adverse effect on the children. John drinks heavily, and Jane constantly nags
him about being a drunk and a failure in life. Although the parties con-
stantly exchange threats, neither party has yet physically carried out such
threats. It has become apparent to both that the marriage is no longer capa-
ble of being saved, but neither party understands what might be done, in
light of their covenant marriage.
The apparent solution seems to be a judicial separation initiated by one
of the parties. Such an action could not take place until after the parties had
physically separated, and it would have to be preceded by marital counsel-
ing. But who is to perform the counseling? Must both parties participate?
Who should be required to pay the costs associated with such counseling?
What proof will a court require to verify good faith effort to preserve the
marriage? Once the court is satisfied that such effort has been made by the
parties a judicial separation can be granted if the court concludes that statu-
tory grounds exist.
In Jane's case, if she could convince a court that John had been habitu-
ally drunk for a year or had offered indignities which would render her
situation intolerable, she may be entitled to the judicial separation. On the
other hand, if John were able to convince a court that Jane's persistent har-
assment constituted general indignities, he would prevail in the matter of a
judicial separation. In its decision to grant a judicial separation, the court
would have to consider the applicability of common law defenses and the
impact of the order on the children.
Once a court has issued an order of judicial separation the couple may
not obtain a divorce until at least two years and six months have elapsed. If
during this period of time the couple conjugally cohabit, the opportunity for
divorce based on living separate and apart is postponed until the mandated
period of separation has been met. On the other hand, if either party engages
in sex with someone else, an immediate divorce is available to the innocent
spouse based on adultery. The statute makes it clear that the judicial separa-
tion does not end the covenant marriage, but merely ends conjugal relations
and common concerns of the parties.
In addition to the order of judicial separation, the court may award a
spouse any relief that may be granted in a divorce, including spousal sup-
port, contributions to education, child custody or visitation, child support,
injunctive relief, and possession and use of the family residence. The statute
makes no mention of the court's ability to make an appropriate division of
marital property. It does appear that property acquired after a judicial sepa-
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ration that leads to divorce will be excluded from the definition of marital
property in the same manner as occurs in a divorce from bed and board.
For John and Jane, irony rests in the fact that they envisioned none of
the consequences when they contracted covenant marriage. Religion, which
served as the foundation for their mutual expectations at the time of the
marriage, plays no role in the state's enforcement of the agreement. Circum-
stances have changed, and the couple lacks the flexibility to address those
changes. The parties are bound by a contract which they may now regret.
XV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO COVENANT MARRIAGE
The central theme in covenant marriage is self-determination. Parties
should be able to express their mutual lifelong commitment through a bind-
ing contract that the state will recognize and enforce. The critical flaw in the
current covenant marriage scheme is that it discounts the contractual aspect
of this commitment and places too much emphasis in redesigning and rede-
fining the civil status of marriage. By viewing the covenant merely as a
contract that is subject to all the remedies usually associated with enforce-
ment of other contracts, excluding specific performance, the state can honor
the wishes of the parties and preserve the integrity of marriage.
States like Arkansas which have adopted the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act offer a couple contemplating marriage the opportunity to
negotiate in advance a broad range of marital and post-marital issues.2
25
This statute allows parties to a premarital agreement to contract with respect
to such matters as property rights, debts and legal obligations, spousal sup-
port, and the choice of law governing the agreement.226 In addition to the
enumerated matters which may be included in such agreements, the parties
may contract with respect to "any other matter, including their personal
rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing
a criminal penalty." 227 The breadth of this provision seems certainly to al-
low the parties contractually to protect the lifelong character of their rela-
tionship.
A provision in a premarital agreement that prohibits divorce under all
circumstances may be considered unenforceable or contrary to public pol-
icy.228 Such a contract would probably encourage adultery, physical abuse,
225. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-401 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
226. Id. § 9-11-403 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
227. See id. § 9-11-403(a)(8).
228. See, e.g., Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32, 38 (Mo. 1980).
There is in every marriage at least an implied agreement not to seek a divorce
and in the usual marriage ceremony the parties exchange pledges to remain man
and wife "until death do us part." The fact is, however, that divorce terminates
marriages almost as frequently as death. It is unnecessary to express an opinion
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and other conduct deemed unacceptable within the state's perception of
marriage. 229 But to the extent the agreement limits divorce to serious mis-
conduct and merely attempts to preserve a marriage that does not offend
critical state interests, there appears to be no reason why it should not be
enforced. In essence, such a provision in a premarital agreement may be
considered a "covenant not to divorce." Like its counterpart in tort, the
covenant not to sue, this provision would not preclude the other party from
filing for divorce when statutory grounds permitted, but the agreement may
allow for the recovery of monetary damages or equitable relief for any
breach. For example, the party injured may recover attorney's fees and court
costs associated with divorce proceedings. Breach of the covenant may also
result in the forfeiture of spousal support or property rights under permissi-
ble circumstances. Courts may also use the agreement as a basis to delay the
proceedings until contractually stipulated mediation takes place. 3°
Unlike a covenant marriage, which may only exist in the state where
the marriage was celebrated, a covenant not to divorce in a premarital
agreement may be enforced anywhere. As stated earlier, the parties may
designate which state's law will govern the enforcement of the agreement.
As is the case with other contracts, a covenant not to divorce can be modi-
fied or rescinded through the mutual consent of the parties without state
involvement. Such an agreement may specifically address, or need not be
concerned with, changes in the divorce laws taking place after execution of
the contract. The parties are given the flexibility to connect their assump-
upon the legality of the mutual promises to refrain from seeking dissolution. It is
sufficient to state that this court finds that such a mutual undertaking, standing
alone or in company with the other provisions of the antenuptial agreement here,
does not constitute "a fair consideration under all the circumstances."
Id.
229. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 779
(1983). In his article, Kronman states:
An antenuptial agreement waiving the right to sue for divorce can be described
as a contract of self-enslavement in just this sense. The parties to a marital con-
tract have considerable freedom to define in advance the nature and extent of
their financial responsibilities in the event of a divorce or separation, but neither
can give the other the power to compel specific performance by waiving the
right to terminate the relationship through divorce. Here, as in the employment
context, the right to substitute damages for the actual performance of the con-
tract is inalienable, and any agreement purporting to forfeit this entitlement is
invalid as a matter of law.
Id.
230. See, e.g., Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 139 (N.Y. 1983). In Avitzur, New
York's highest court upheld the general enforcement of a clause recorded in a ketubah, a
document that accompanies a traditional Jewish wedding ceremony. The clause required the
married couple to appear before a rabbinic court, or bet din, to comply with Jewish divorce
procedures in the event of marital dissolution. Id.
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tions regarding the longevity of the marriage to other expectations embod-
ied in the terms of the premarital agreement.
XVI. CONCLUSION
Covenant marriage is more about process than it is about the people
Who enter marriage. It is about the process by which a couple makes the
decision to marry, the process by which the marriage takes place, and the
process by which the parties separate and divorce. People who enter mar-
riage do so with the expectation that they are entering a union for life, but if,
God forbid, disaster occurs, there is a way for them to pick up the pieces of
their lives and start anew. Because covenant marriage adds nothing to the
expectations of most people contemplating marriage, its primary effect is to
limit marriage by defining it restrictively for the parties who contract to do
so.
Legislative involvement in covenant marriage reflects the state's in-
ability to distinguish between the consent of the parties to be married and
the desire of an individual to stay married. Crucial to a determination of the
validity of a marriage is the mental state of the parties at the time of the
union, but it is the daily commitment made by marital partners that fosters
true benefits to the state. Although each state has an interest in validating a
couple's consent to be married, the issue of staying married lies at the foun-
dation of individual liberty.
Divorce is inextricably tied to the state's interest in marriage. Most
states tolerate divorce because the state's interest in marriage is not being
served. In such cases the state's best interest is met when these bad relation-
ships are dissolved and strong viable ones are formed. Covenant marriage,
although well-intended, impedes the state's interest in marriage by prolong-
ing unions that the state, under ordinary circumstances, views as not worth
preserving. The sole basis for the impediment is an agreement which may
have been executed under circumstances that were clearly not at arm's
length.
The state's interest in marriage does not vary from couple to couple,
and therefore a single definition of marriage is required. This single defini-
tion should include the expectation that all marriages are initially intended
to be lifelong relationships, and there can only be one set of rules for dis-
solving the relationship. When a couple wishes to add features to their mar-
riage that call for greater accountability, greater economic responsibility, or
greater flexibility, the state should protect their right to do so through con-
tracts which do not offend important public policies.
Any state weighing the covenant marriage option should consider .the
ramifications of a marriage alternative that may be more likely to perpetuate
discord than rejuvenate relationships. Each state must determine whether
the prospect of advancing premarital deliberation justifies returning to a
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time when only the most dangerous or reprehensible conduct would justify
dissolution of all failed marriages. Finally, states considering covenant mar-
riage should explore less restrictive alternatives that will preserve the integ-
rity and viability of marriage as an institution.
